# Discussion of Solvency and wholesale funding cost interactions at UK banks

Dent, Hoke and Panagiotopoulos

Christoph Fricke <sup>1</sup>


 $^1$ Deutsche Bundesbank christoph.fricke@bundesbank.de

September2017

The views expressed here are the authors' and do not necessarily represent the views of Deutsche Bundesbank or the Eurosystem.

1 / 10


# Chart 1 Range of indicative measures of bank funding spreads<sup>(a)</sup>



Sources: Bank of England, Barclays Live, Markit Group Limited and Bank calculations.

(a) The swathe includes three measures of long-term wholesale funding spreads for UK banks: the average of major UK banks' five-year euro-denominated senior CDS; quoted rates on one-year fixed-rate bonds over one-year swap rates for UK banks; and the Barclays Live 'Pan-Euro Corporate Banking'. Senior – Spread' series.

# Chart A Market-based capital ratios and funding costs(a)(b)(c)(d)



#### Overview - Motivation

#### Is bank (default) risk reflected in funding costs?

- Before crisis: Investors might have missed systemic component
- During crisis: Repricing of risk!
  - ightarrow Investors ask for a resilient banking sector
- After crisis: Regulatory initiatives

#### Does a vicious cycle exist?

Feedback-loops? (Brunnermeier and Petersen, 2009)

- Feedback effect from solvency to funding costs and reverse?
- Example: Deutsche Bank's 14 billion USD fee: solvency concerns
- Need by regulators to understand this channel

### Econometric Approach

- Exploration of determinants for U.K. bank CDS premia changes
- Horse race of 3 econometric specifications:
  - Panel linear model
  - Panel threshold model
  - Panel smooth transition model
  - Panel VAR with sign restrictions?
- Econometric specifications:

$$\Delta CDS_{i,t}^{(5y)} = \alpha_i + \beta_1 \times Solvency_{i,t} + \beta_2 \times \Delta rf_{i,t}^{5y} + \beta_3 \times \Delta CDS_{i,t}^{(5y,Bid-Ask)} + \beta_4 \times \Delta \sigma(Equity)_{i,t}^{30d} + \beta_5 \times \Delta \sigma(FTSE)_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

• Solvency<sub>i,t</sub> as bank i's leverage ratio  $\frac{Market\ Value\ of\ Equity}{Book\ Value\ of\ Assets}$ 

# Key Findings

#### Non-linear effects do exist

- Threshold models reveal better goodness-of-fit
- Threshold at 2.4%; below regulatory leverage ratio

#### What are the economic implications?

- Linear models underestimate effects
   Evidence for tail events?
- Threshold below regulatory leverage ratio under Basel III Did regulators either ...
  - stabilized the banking sector, or
  - increased the regulatory burden?

## Comments I – From an econometric viewpoint

#### Identification

- Persistence of CDS price (changes)? Control for lagged variables
- Multicollinearity?

Two volatility measures: Market & bank volatility

unconditional correlation: 0.6976

## Comments II – From an economic viewpoint

#### Identification

• Does "market-based leverage ratio" (MBLR) solely measures solvency?

$$MBLR = \frac{Market\ Value\ of\ Equity}{Book\ Value\ of\ Assets}$$
 $MBLR = \frac{weekly\ data}{quarterly\ data}$ 

- Tobin's q: majority of fluctuations driven by share price fluctuations:
  - future earning expectations
  - discount rate
  - $\rightarrow$  Focus on discount rate / risk premia

# Comments II – From an economic viewpoint

#### **Policy implications**

- Does a feedback loop exist?
  - Solvency  $\uparrow \rightarrow CDS \uparrow \rightarrow Solvency \uparrow$

#### If yes, how do banks react?

- delay bond issuance?
- fire-sale assets? (Greenwood et al., 2015)
- is there a systemic risk component in their behaviour?

Thanks and good luck with the paper